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This paper investigates the purchases and redemptions of a large cross-sectional
sample of German equity funds. We ﬁnd that investors punish bad performance
by selling their shares, but also have a tendency to sell winners. Investors in large
fund families show higher sales and redemption rates. Furthermore, family size also
aﬀects the ﬂow-performance relationship. On the one hand, investors in large families
punish bad performance more, on the other, they also tend to sell winners more.
Finally, we ﬁnd that inner-family rankings play an important role for redemptions,
with investors strongly redeeming their shares from intra-family losers.
Keywords: Mutual Funds, Fund Family, Flow-Performance Relationship
JEL: G20, G23Non-technical summary
The open-ended structure of mutual funds oﬀers investors in principle an important
disciplining mechanism: investors can reward the good performance of a mutual fund
with inﬂows and punish poor performance with outﬂows (Fama & Jensen 1983). However,
many studies have documented that mutual fund investors insuﬃciently punish poorly
performing funds by withdrawing their money (e.g. Ippolito 1992, Chevalier & Ellison
1997, Sirri & Tufano 1998). At the same time, the fact that the average holding period
of mutual fund investors is surprisingly low, ranging between only two and three years
(Barber et al. 2005), reveals that investors actively manage their mutual fund holdings.
In this paper, we examine the ﬂow-performance relationship of in and outﬂows for
German equity funds over the period from 2003 to 2008. More speciﬁcally, we are
interested in whether old investors punish poorly performing funds by withdrawing their
money. A further issue is how the investment company, also known as the fund family,
aﬀects the purchase and redemption decision of mutual fund investors. Fund families
can reduce the transaction costs, e.g. which investors incur when changing from one
fund to another. First, it is common practice to reduce or even waive load fees when an
investor switches funds within the same fund family. Second, the fund family can reduce
the search costs of investors through marketing. Since larger fund families oﬀer a wider
spectrum of funds, investors have more opportunities to choose funds and thus we expect
to observe a higher trading activity in larger fund families. We further hypothesize that
reduced transaction costs in larger families should strengthen the punishment eﬀect for
the worst performing funds. Moreover, we argue that the relative performance of a fund
within a family matters primarily for the redemption decision given that the transaction
costs are only reduced within a fund family.
Overall, our ﬁndings generally support the notion that investors punish poor perfor-
mance. When we investigate the role of fund family size, we ﬁnd that funds in larger
families experience higher inﬂows as well as higher outﬂows. More importantly, our
results point to a diﬀerential impact of relative performance measures for mutual fund
in and outﬂows. Apart from a level eﬀect, our results also reveal that family size aﬀects
the ﬂow-performance relationship. More speciﬁcally, existing investors in large families
punish poor performance more severely than investors in small families. Finally, we
provide evidence that the decisions to buy or sell mutual shares are based on diﬀerent
relative performance measures. While new investors chase the top performers within a
fund category, old investors punish poor performance within the fund family.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Die oﬀene Struktur von Investmentfonds stellt prinzipiell einen wichtigen
Sanktionierungsmechanismus für Investoren dar: Einerseits können Investoren gute
Performance durch Zuﬂüsse belohnen, andererseits können sie eine schwache Performance
durch Abﬂüsse bestrafen (Fama & Jensen 1983). Eine Vielzahl von Studien hat jedoch
festgestellt, dass Investoren eine schlechte Performance nur unzureichend durch Abﬂüsse
bestrafen (z.B. Ippolito 1992, Chevalier & Ellison 1997, Sirri & Tufano 1998). Dies steht
im Gegensatz zu der Tatsache, dass die durchschnittliche Haltedauer von Investmentfonds
nur zwischen zwei und drei Jahren liegt (Barber et al. 2005). Letzteres ist ein Hinweis
dafür, dass die Investoren ihre Anlagen in Investmentfonds aktiv steuern.
In diesem Arbeitspapier untersuchen wir den Zusammenhang zwischen Mittelﬂüssen
und Performance von deutschen Investmentfonds in dem Zeitraum von 2003 bis 2008.
Insbesondere ist von Interesse, ob bereits bestehende Investoren schlechte Performance
durch Anteilverkäufe bestrafen. Des Weiteren ist von Bedeutung, inwiefern die Kapital-
anlagegesellschaft des Fonds, die sogenannte Fonds-Familie, einen Einﬂuss auf den
Zusammenhang zwischen Mittelﬂüssen und Performance hat. Fonds-Familien können das
Anlageverhalten von Altinvestoren beeinﬂussen, indem sie die Transaktionskosten, die bei
einem Fondswechsel anfallen, reduzieren. Erstens werden gewöhnlich Ausgabeaufschlag
und Rücknahmeabschlag bei einem Fondswechsel innerhalb derselben Fonds-Familie
reduziert oder sogar erlassen. Zweitens können die Suchkosten für den Investor durch
gezieltes Marketing reduziert werden. Da größere Fonds-Familien ihren Investoren eine
größere Auswahl an Fonds sowie geringere Transaktionskosten anbieten können, erwarten
wir eine höhere Handelsaktivität für diese Fonds. Die reduzierten Transaktionskosten
in großen Fonds-Familien können darüber hinaus zu einer verstärkten Bestrafung einer
schwachen Performance führen. Da die Transaktionskosten jedoch lediglich in der eigenen
Fonds-Familie reduziert werden, sollte das Performanceranking eines Fonds nicht nur
innerhalb seiner Anlagekategorie, sondern auch innerhalb seiner Familie eine Rolle für
die Verkaufsentscheidung von Investoren spielen.
Allgemein lassen unsere Ergebnisse darauf schließen, dass Investoren eine schlechte
Ertragskraft durch Abﬂüsse bestrafen. Bei größeren Fonds-Familien kommt es sowohl zu
größeren Zu- als auch vermehrten Abﬂüssen. Zusätzlich zu einem Niveaueﬀekt können
wir einen veränderten Zusammenhang zwischen Mittelﬂüssen und Performance bei großen
Fondsfamilien feststellen. Insbesondere kommt es in großen Fonds-Familien zu einer
stärkeren Bestrafung von schlechter Performance. Des Weiteren zeigen wir, dass die Kauf-
und Verkaufsentscheidung von Investoren auf unterschiedlichen relativen Performance-rankings beruhen. Während die Kaufentscheidung hauptsächlich von dem Ranking über
die Investmentkategorie getrieben wird, ist die Verkaufsentscheidung durch das Ranking
innerhalb der eigenen Fonds-Familie beeinﬂusst.Contents
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References 181 Introduction
The open-ended structure of mutual funds oﬀers investors in principle an important mon-
itoring mechanism: investors can reward the good performance of a mutual fund with
inﬂows and punish poor performance with outﬂows (Fama & Jensen 1983). However,
many studies have documented, that mutual fund investors only insuﬃciently punish
poorly performing funds by withdrawing their money (e.g. Ippolito 1992, Chevalier &
Ellison 1997, Sirri & Tufano 1998). Given the reluctance to punish poor performance
the average holding period of mutual fund investors is surprisingly low, ranging between
only two and three years (Barber et al. 2005). This raises the question of why investors
fail to punish the poor performance of fund managers, even though they change funds so
frequently.
Using a comprehensive data set that provides monthly purchases and redemptions of
all equity funds registered in Germany, this paper tries to address this question. Being
able to disaggregate net ﬂows into sales and redemptions for a large cross-sectional data
set allows us to gain further insights into investors’ buy and sell decisions. In particular,
we are interested in the driving factors behind redemptions.
The feasibility to eﬀectively punish a mutual fund by redeeming one’s shares is closely
connected with transactions costs. When switching from one fund to another, investors
face search costs and fees. These load fees are either charged when leaving a fund or, more
commonly, when entering into a new fund. Front-end and back-end loads put together
make up a considerable amount and average around four percent of the share value in
our sample. High switching costs would explain the investors’ low propensity to redeem
shares and thus punish poor performance. However, as mentioned before, the average
holding period is relatively low, which should be reﬂected in a higher punishment of
under-performing funds.
In this paper we argue that fund families play an important role in the redemption
decision of mutual fund investors. Fund families can reduce the costs of switching from
1one fund to another. A common practice is to allow investors to switch from one fund to
another within the same family at a discount or for no fee at all. Furthermore, the fund
family provides investors with more information on other funds within the same family
(e.g. by marketing) and thereby lowers search costs. Overall, larger fund families oﬀer
the investors more opportunities to switch between funds at lower transaction costs.
We ﬁrst investigate how past performance aﬀects purchases and redemptions sepa-
rately. Second, we analyze how the fund family size aﬀects the level of in- and outﬂows
and the shape of each ﬂow-performance relationship. Finally, if switching funds within the
fund family plays an important role in investors’ redemption decision, the fund’s family
ranking will potentially aﬀect in- and outﬂows. We therefore study how the intra-family
ranking in addition to the category ranking aﬀect in- and outﬂows.
Our main ﬁndings are as folows: First, redemptions react to past performance and
the relationship is u-shaped. On the one hand, existing investors in a fund punish bad
performance by withdrawing their money. On the other, some investors cash in their gains
and sell winning funds, which is known as the disposition eﬀect. Second, the size of the
fund family changes the level of redemptions and the shape of the ﬂow-performance rela-
tionship. Larger fund families have a higher redemption rate and a higher purchase rate.
The elevated redemption rate leads to an increased punishment of the worst performing
funds. However, in some cases it also results in a higher tendency to sell winning funds.
Finally, this paper looks at a performance comparison within the same fund family. We
ﬁnd that, in addition to the documented sensitivity to bad performance in the overall
ranking, redemptions also react quite strongly to an intra-family ranking.
The paper is related to two strands of literature: First, the paper contributes to
the gross ﬂow literature on mutual funds. While there is a wealth of literature that
relates net ﬂows to past performance (e.g. Ippolito 1992, Chevalier & Ellison 1997, Sirri
& Tufano 1998), articles that investigate inﬂows and outﬂows of mutual funds separately
are relatively scarce. This is because data on inﬂows and outﬂows is not usually available
and net ﬂows are approximated using the growth of total net assets adjusted for the growth
2due to the funds’ return. However, since the decision to buy a mutual fund potentially
diﬀers from the decision to sell a mutual fund, it is important to analyze inﬂows and
outﬂows separately (Ivkovic & Weisbenner 2009).
The gross fund literature is particularly interested in whether old investors use the
possibility of punishing poor performance by redeeming their shares. Results on how re-
demption rates relate to past performance are mixed. While some studies ﬁnd no response
of outﬂows to past performance (e.g. Bergstresser & Poterba 2002, Johnson 2007), others
ﬁnd that redemptions increase with bad performance (e.g. O’Neal 2004, Ivkovic & Weis-
benner 2009). Since these studies use relatively small sample they potentially suﬀer from
selection bias, which might provide an explanation for these conﬂicting ﬁndings (Johnson
2007).1 Our paper contributes to the literature by using a large cross-sectional sample of
German equity funds. This sample contains all mutual funds registered in Germany and
provides the amount of purchases and redemptions with a monthly frequency and thus
overcomes possible selection biases.
Second, our paper relates to the growing literature on fund families (e.g. Massa 2003,
Nanda et al. 2004, Gaspar et al. 2006). In particular, it refers to Kempf & Ruenzi (2008a),
who show that, besides the investment category ranking, the ranking within a fund family
also matters for net ﬂows. Furthermore, Kempf & Ruenzi (2008b) ﬁnd that in addition to
tournaments within an investment category (Brown et al. 1996) there are also tournaments
within a fund family. This paper brings together these two strands - the literature on gross
ﬂows and on fund families - by showing that while new money (the purchase decision)
is closely related to the overall category ranking, old money (the redemption decision) is
related to the ranking within a fund family.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data set
that is used. Section 3 investigates the ﬂow-performance relationship of in- out and net
1These studies mostly focus on proprietary data from a single fund family or concentrate only on the
200 largest mutual funds. The only studies that we know of that use a wider cross-sectional data set are
Christoﬀersen et al. (2005) and Cashman et al. (2007) for the US and Keswani & Stolin (2008) for the
UK.
3ﬂows. In section 4 we analyze the diﬀerence in the ﬂow-performance relationship between
large and small fund families. Finally, in section 5 we look at how the intra-family ranking
aﬀects purchases and redemptions. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Mutual Fund Data
The sample consists of mutual funds that are registered in Germany and are thus required
to report to the central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank.2 The reporting data are our
main data set and contain information on the number of shares outstanding, total net
assets, buy and sell prices and dividends paid. The data set also includes funds that
either ceased to exist or merged with other funds and is therefore free of a survivorship-
bias. To make funds comparable we only consider funds with a suﬃcient number of
funds in their peer group3: funds that invest in Germany, Europe and funds with a
global investment objective. The information on the investment objective as well as the
total expense ratio was obtained from the German Federal Association of Investment
Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Investmentgesellschaften, BVI). Since calculation
of the total expense ratio was only standardized in 2003 we restrict our sample to the
period from 2003 to 2008.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
In Table 1 we show summary statistics of the sample. Panel A provides the number of
funds in Germany over time, by investment objective (Germany, Europe or Global) and for
load funds. Overall, the number of funds increases slightly over time, which is primarily
due to the launch of new funds with a European investment focus. The majority of our
2There are a number of funds that are registered in Luxembourg and marketed in Germany. These
funds do not report to the Deutsche Bundesbank and are therefore not included in this sample.
3We omit index funds, sector funds and foreign single-country funds.
4sample is dominated by funds that charge load fees. Panel B highlights that the total
net assets managed grew from 2003 to 2007 and dropped sharply in 2008. The increase
in assets up to 2007 is due to the appreciation in the value of assets. In fact, net ﬂows
were negative on average in this period, meaning that investors sold these mutual funds.
Redemption rates are astonishingly high, averaging at around 36 percent. This implies
an average holding period of 35 months, which is fairly short given that equity mutual
funds tend to be considered a long-term investment. The latter aspect is particulary
surprising given that total loads average at around 4 percent. However, the short holding
period seems not to be country-speciﬁc. Barber et al. (2005) ﬁnd similarly short holding
periods for the US market of around 30 months in the late 90s. The table further displays
statistics on common mutual fund characteristics, such as return, standard deviation, age,
size and fees in Panel C.
2.2 Fund Flows
Mutual funds report the amount of redeemed and purchased shares in euros for each
month to the Deutsche Bundesbank. We calculate in-, out- and net ﬂows separately in









Netflowi,t = Inflowi,t − Outflowi,t (3)
All ﬂows are annualized by multiplying them by a factor of 12. Very unusual ﬂows can
occur for very young funds, when mergers take place or when a fund closes down. To
avoid these outliers we omit observations with a growth rate below the 1st and above the
599th percentile.
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlation coeﬃcient of net ﬂows, inﬂows and outﬂows. It
is noteworthy that we observe a high positive correlation coeﬃcient between inﬂows and
outﬂows. This suggests that funds with higher inﬂows also experience higher outﬂows.
2.3 Performance Measures
We use three alternative measures of performance which are commonly reported for mu-
tual funds (e.g. by Morningstar): the raw return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen’s Alpha. The
raw return is calculated assuming that gross dividends are reinvested immediately. We
calculate the Sharpe Ratio as the average excess return in the evaluation period divided






where Ri is the monthly return of fund i, Rf the risk-free rate measured by the 1-month
EURIBOR. To estimate the Sharpe Ratio we use data for the past 24 months.
Finally, we use the performance measure proposed by Jensen (1968). Jensen’s Alpha
is estimated as follows:
Ri − R
f = αi + βi(R
m − R
f), (5)
where Ri is again the return of fund i and Rf the risk-free rate, again measured by
the 1-month EURIBOR, and Rm is the return of the market portfolio. The return on the
market portfolio is measured by the benchmark index for each investment objective. We
use the following three benchmark indices, which are generally used to evaluate mutual
funds: MSCI Germany, MSCI Europe and MSCI Global Index. The evaluation period
for the performance measures is 24 months. Using shorter or longer evaluation periods,
such as 12 and 36 months, shows very similar results. Because we are using a 24-month
evaluation period, we exclude funds with less than two years of data from our sample.
63 Flow-Performance Relationship
3.1 Univariate Analysis
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis of investors’ buying and selling behavior in response to
performance, we conduct a simple univariate analysis. Following Sirri & Tufano (1998)
and Huang et al. (2007), we rank mutual funds within their investment objective in ten
deciles based on their performance, where performance is measured by the raw return over
the past 24 months.4 Taking the average of ﬂows in each decile, we obtain a cross-sectional
ﬂow-performance relationship for in-, out- and net ﬂows. The results of this procedure
for our three performance measures can be found in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Net ﬂows show the familiar convex shape (e.g. Zheng 2008). Note that in the sample
period aggregate net ﬂows are negative, which is also reﬂected in this graph. Net ﬂows are
for the most part negative, only the top performing funds experience positive growth. The
convex shape of net ﬂows is mainly driven by inﬂows into the fund. The top performing
funds show an annualized inﬂow rate of around 50 percent, while a fund with an average
performance (i.e. the 5th decile) shows inﬂows of around 17 percent. Interestingly, inﬂows
do not change at all when moving from a fund with an average performance to the worst
performing funds. The worst performing funds experience inﬂows at about the same level,
which is a sign of the status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988, Kempf & Ruenzi
2006).
Outﬂows are at a relatively high level of around 30 percent. The ﬂow-performance
relationship of redemptions is weakly u-shaped. While the 5th decile shows outﬂows of 26
percent, the worst performing funds have outﬂows of about 32 percent. This suggests that
4The raw returns diﬀer signiﬁcantly across deciles. More speciﬁcally, the diﬀerence between the mean
return of funds in the 1st and 2nd decile is 6 percent and amounts to around 8 percent for funds in the
9th and 10th decile. These return diﬀerences should thus present an incentive for investors to switch
between funds of diﬀerent performance deciles.
7some investors punish the worst performing funds by withdrawing their money. On the
other hand, we also observe heightened outﬂows for the best performing funds of about
38 percent, which can be interpreted as selling winners (see Kahneman & Tversky 1979,
Shefrin & Statman 1985).
3.2 Multivariate Analysis
In order to estimate the ﬂow-performance relationship, we run a piecewise-linear regression
(see e.g. Sirri & Tufano 1998, Huang et al. 2007). For each month, mutual funds are ranked
within their investment objective according to their past performance, where performance
is measured by the raw return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen’s Alpha over the past 24 months.
This rank is then normalized such that ranks are evenly distributed between zero and one,
where zero is assigned to the worst performing fund and one to the best performing fund.
Funds are then categorized into low, medium and high performing funds: Low performing
funds include the lowest performance quintile, medium performing funds the three middle
performance quintiles and the high performing funds the highest performance quintile.
The three variables for the regression are deﬁned as follows:
Lowi = Min(Ranki,0.20)
Midi = Min(Ranki − Lowi,0.60) (6)
Highi = Ranki − Midi − Lowi,
where Ranki is the percentile rank of the fund. Thus, the coeﬃcients of Low, Mid and
High represent the piecewise decomposition of the percentile rank and can be interpreted
as the slope of the ﬂow-performance relationship within the performance range.
In addition to performance, several other variables might inﬂuence ﬂows into and out
of mutual funds. For this reason, we include size measured by the natural logarithm
of total net assets, fund age measured by the natural logarithm of one plus age in years,
8volatility measured by 24-month standard deviation of monthly returns and total expenses
in the regression.5 Further, we include the aggregate ﬂows of the investment objective
into the regression to control for possible market-wide sentiment shifts. The regression
model is speciﬁed as follows:
Flow i,t = β0 + β1Lowi,t−1 + β2Midi,t−1 + β3Highi,t−1
+ β4Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t
We run a Fama-MacBeth regression of fund ﬂows on performance and controls for
each month and provide average coeﬃcient estimates in Table 3. Since performance is
measured over the past 24 months, the estimates are likely to be autocorrelated. To
address this issue, we use Newey-West autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity-consistent
standard errors with ﬁve lags.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results of the univariate analysis are conﬁrmed. Net ﬂows show the familiar convex
pattern, which is mainly driven by the strong convexity of inﬂows. This result aﬃrms
previous evidence that mutual fund investors chase past relative performance (Sirri &
Tufano 1998). Additionally, we are also able to identify a u-shaped pattern of outﬂows.
This means that investors withdraw their money from badly performing funds. When
looking at the raw return as a performance measure, the outﬂows of the worst performing
funds are about 9 percentage points higher than for the average fund. On the other
hand, investors also sell their winning funds. Outﬂows from the best performing funds
are about 6 percentage points higher than for the average fund. This disposition eﬀect is
5Total expenses are measured by expense ratio + 1/3 total load. Since the average holding period was
2 - 3 years in the sample, we adjust the calculation of total fees as proposed by Sirri & Tufano (1998).
Note that Barber et al. (2005) ﬁnd similar results for US mutual funds with an average holding period
of 30 months in the late 1990s.
9usually obscured by the strong inﬂows to the best performing funds when only net ﬂows
are observed. These results are robust for all performance measures.
The control variables also reveal new insights into mutual fund investors’ buy and sell
decisions. A number of control variables work in the same direction for in- and outﬂows
and thus cancel each other out when they are used to explain net ﬂows. In our estimation,
these variables are size, age, total fees and also volatility. Both in- and outﬂows increase
with size, while the overall eﬀect on net ﬂows is negative but insigniﬁcant. The negative
eﬀect of size on net ﬂows is in line with the literature (Chevalier & Ellison 1997, Sirri &
Tufano 1998, Huang et al. 2007).
The age of a fund reduces the intensity of trading. Both inﬂows and outﬂows are
negatively related to the age of the fund, while the eﬀect for net ﬂows is insigniﬁcant.
Total fees also show counteracting eﬀects for in- and outﬂows. On the one hand, a
higher expense ratio is associated with a higher level of inﬂows. While this may appear
counterintuitive at ﬁrst sight, the positive eﬀect has been explained in the literature by the
fact that expenses are a proxy for marketing expenses. Sirri & Tufano (1998) argue that
increasing expenses heightens the fund’s visibility and thus leads to more new purchases
of the fund. On the other hand, the costs of ﬁnancing the marketing eﬀorts cause the
investors that have already invested in the fund to leave.
Separating net ﬂows into purchases and redemptions also reveals some new insights
into the investors’ choices and the volatility of a fund’s assets. The hypothesis that fund
investors are risk averse, i.e. fund volatility is negatively related to net ﬂows, ﬁnds only
fairly weak support. Fund volatility is negatively related but only marginally signiﬁcant
when we use raw returns as a performance measure (compare e.g. Sirri & Tufano 1998,
James & Karceski 2006, Chen et al. 2007). Turning to outﬂows, we observe that investors
that are already in the fund do indeed withdraw their money if the fund’s volatility
increases. Surprisingly, inﬂows are positively related to fund volatility. The eﬀect of
volatility on inﬂows is signiﬁcant when we use risk adjusted performance measures such
as the Sharpe Ratio and Jensen’s Alpha to calculate volatility. A possible explanation
10for this result is provided by diﬀerent investor clienteles. Apparently, more risk-averse
investors exit funds when volatility rises and are replaced by more risk-seeking investors.
Overall, the disaggregation of net ﬂows into its components purchases and redemp-
tions reveals important insights in the actual behavior of the investors. We ﬁnd that
there are several variables that eﬀect investors inside and outside the fund diﬀerently.
While inﬂows show a strong convex ﬂow-performance relationship, the ﬂow-performance
relationship of outﬂows is u-shaped. Existing investors punish the worst performing funds
by withdrawing their money, but at the same time they cash in gains by leaving the best
performing funds.
4 Flow-Performance Sensitivity and Fund Family Size
In the previous section, we examined the ﬂow-performance relationship based on relative
performance rankings within diﬀerent investment categories. While the convex shape of
the ﬂow-performance relationship is well documented in the literature, the role of fund
families has received less attention (Nanda et al. 2004). The mutual fund company that
a fund belongs to, also known as the fund family, plays an important role for the member
funds and provides additional services to the investors. Commonly, fund families oﬀer
investors the opportunity to switch funds within a mutual fund family for free or for a
reduced load fee. Furthermore, through the families’ marketing eﬀorts the investor is
more aware of other funds within the same fund family and thus also reduces transaction
costs. Since a large fund family can oﬀer a wider range of potential target funds at lower
costs to the investor, we expect investor behavior to diﬀer according to family size. More
speciﬁcally, we hypothesize that investors in large families switch more frequently between
funds and thus potentially react more swiftly to diﬀerences in performance.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
11In fact, Figure 2 conﬁrms that both inﬂows and outﬂows are substantially higher for
larger families. While small fund families with up to ten funds have a redemption rate
of 23 percent, large fund families whose number of funds lies between 31 and 40 have
a redemption rate of 45 percent. This implies an average holding period of 52 months
for small families and only 27 months for large fund families. The heightened activity of
investors in large fund families also potentially aﬀects the shape of the ﬂow-performance
relationship. That is, the sanctioning mechanism for managers may be more pronounced
in large families, because investors are confronted with lower transactions costs when
switching from one fund to another within a family.
4.1 Univariate Analysis
To investigate the eﬀect of family size on the ﬂow-performance sensitivity of investors,
we separately analyze large and small fund families. We measure fund family size by
the number of funds in the family. For each month we divide the sample into small
families, whose size is below the median family size, and large families, whose size is
above the median family size. We then rank the fund according to its performance within
the investment objective and form ten deciles and average in- out- and net ﬂows in each
decile. The ﬂow-performance relationship of large and small fund families obtained in this
way is displayed in Figure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The overall shape of the relationship for net ﬂows is similar for small and large families.
However, large diﬀerences exist at the upper and lower end of the performance distribu-
tion. The top performing funds of smaller families receive substantially higher net ﬂows
than top performers from large families. In addition, the worst performers of large families
also face much higher redemptions than their peers from smaller families. Turning to in-
and outﬂows separately, we observe that the diﬀerences for net ﬂows are primarily driven
12by outﬂows. Outﬂows vary in level and shape for large and small families. In fact, the
outﬂows of the worst performing funds in large families are substantially higher than in
smaller families.
With regard to inﬂows, we also observe diﬀerences but to a lesser extent. Funds from
larger families receive more inﬂows of new money than their peers from smaller families.
However, these diﬀerences only exist in the center decile while in the top and bottom
deciles the discrepancy disappears. This result provides initial support for our hypothesis
that family size leads to an asymmetric ﬂow-performance relationship. Investors in large
families do indeed seem to punish underperforming funds more strongly by withdrawing
money. At the same time, investors in top performers of large families also appear to
withdraw more money in relative terms, than from similar funds in smaller families,
which indicates an increased disposition eﬀect. Overall, the larger redemption rate in
combination with a higher level of purchases indicates that investors change their funds
more often in larger fund complexes.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis
To further evaluate the asymmetric ﬂow-performance relation induced by family size, we
run a regression of ﬂows on performance including a dummy variable for a large family
and also interacting the dummy variable with the performance segments. The estimated
model is as follows:
Flow i,t = β0 + β1Lowi,t−1 + β2Lowi,t−1 ∗ Large Familyi,t−1 (7)
+ β3Midi,t−1 + β4Midi,t−1 ∗ Large Familyi,t−1
+ β5Highi,t−1 + β6Highi,t−1 ∗ Large Familyi,t−1
+ β7Family Sizei,t−1 + β8Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t,
where Flow i,t is either in-, out- or net ﬂows, Lowi,t−1, Midi,t−1 and Highi,t−1 are the
13performance segments as deﬁned previously, Large Familyi,t−1 is a dummy variable that
is one if the family size is above median and zero otherwise. Family Sizei,t−1 is measured
by the number of funds in the family. All previously included control variables remain
unchanged.
We show the results of Eq. 7 in Table 4. Belonging to a large fund family increases
both inﬂows and outﬂows. An increase of one fund in family size leads to an increase
of inﬂows by 0.84 percentage point and an increase of outﬂows by 1.04 percentage point,
when considering the raw return as a performance measure. This is in line with the
ﬁndings of Figure 3. The level eﬀect of belonging to a large fund family on net ﬂows is
negative.
More importantly, the family size not only aﬀects the level of in- and outﬂows, but also
the shape of the ﬂow-performance relationship. Investors in funds of large families are
more responsive to bad performance than investors in small fund families. When taking
the raw return as a performance measure, the worst performing funds of large fund families
have redemption rates that are 14 percentage points higher than the best performer in the
lowest segment. In small fund families, on the other hand, redemption rates for the worst
performing funds are only around 7 percentage points higher than the best performer in
the lowest segment. This eﬀect is even more pronounced when measuring performance
by the Sharpe Ratio or Jensen’s Alpha, where funds of small families show no signiﬁcant
punishment. Apparently, the reduced transaction costs reinforce the disciplining eﬀect via
withdrawals of investors in the worst performing funds. Moreover, funds in the medium
performance segment have a stronger inﬂow-performance sensitivity when they belong to
larger fund families. Huang et al. (2007) provide a possible explanation by arguing that
the medium performers beneﬁt from the enhanced visibility of larger fund families.
Regarding top performing funds of large families, we ﬁnd no clear-cut result concern-
ing in- and outﬂows. The size of the fund family does not aﬀect the ﬂow-performance
relationship in a signiﬁcant way.
145 Intra-Family Ranking and Investor Flows
Next, we examine the performance of a fund relative to its family peers. Our working
hypothesis is that the family ranking also matters for existing investors. These investors
potentially focus their investment decisions on a narrower group of funds oﬀered by the
fund family. This focus on the fund family may be induced by lower transaction costs
and enhanced visibility, which leads existing investors to switch predominantly between
funds within a family rather than between families.
To measure the relative success of a fund within its family, we follow Kempf & Ruenzi
(2008a) and order all funds belonging to the same fund family according to their category
rank. Based on this category rank we then assign a new fund family rank and standardize
this relative performance measure as before. We then run the following regression model
including both the category and family ranking:
Flow i,t = β0 + β1Category Lowi,t−1 + β2Category Midi,t−1 + β3Category Highi,t−1
+ β4Family Lowi,t−1 + β5Family Midi,t−1 + β6Family Highi,t−1
+ β7Controlsi,t−1 + εi,t, (8)
where Flow i,t is again either in-, out- or net ﬂows, Category Lowi,t−1, Midi,t−1 and
Highi,t−1 is the piecewise decomposition of the category rank and Family Lowi,t−1,
Midi,t−1 and Highi,t−1 the piecewise decomposition of the family rank (see Eq. 6 for
details). Control variables are the same as before. We display the results in Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Most notably, outﬂows are no longer aﬀected by the category ranking for the worst
performing funds. Instead, outﬂows from funds in the lowest performance segment only
react to the family ranking. The size of the redemptions is economically signiﬁcant. The
15worst performing funds in a family incur between 4 and 6 percent more outﬂows according
to our three performance measures than the best performer in the lowest segment of the
family ranking. New money, however, is unaﬀected by the family ranking and follows
only the performance ranking within the category. In other words, new money is chasing
winners within the category, while old money exits from the losers within the family.
This is in line with the ﬁndings of Kempf & Ruenzi (2008b), who report that mutual fund
managers also participate in intra-family tournaments.
Our results highlight an important feature of investors’ purchase and redemption de-
cisions. Speciﬁcally, the investment decisions are based on diﬀerent relative performance
measures. This evidence contrasts with Ivkovic & Weisbenner (2009), who argue that
redemptions are driven by absolute performance.6 Furthermore, our ﬁndings are also im-
portant for studies examining net ﬂows. Since diﬀerent relative performance measures
impact in- and outﬂow this needs to be taken into account for net ﬂows.
Our results for the distinct relative performance measures aﬀecting in- and outﬂows are
robust across the three performance measures used. Finally, the results in Table 5 show
mixed evidence for the tendency of investors to sell winners. The coeﬃcient for outﬂows
from top performers by category rank is positive for two of our three performance measures
but only signiﬁcant when we use raw returns.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence of the diﬀerential impact of relative performance mea-
sures for mutual fund in- and outﬂows. First, we conﬁrm the convex net ﬂow-performance
relationship typically found in the literature. Separating net ﬂows into in- and outﬂows
also reveals a convex shape for inﬂows but a u-shaped relation for outﬂows. For inﬂow
this implies that new money chases winners while old money punishes losers but that
investors also tend to sell winners.
6We also tested absolute performance as a driver of outﬂows but failed to detect any evidence in
support of this measure.
16Second, when we investigate the role of family size, we ﬁnd that funds in larger families
experience higher in- and outﬂows. Apart from a level eﬀect, our results also reveal that
family size aﬀects the ﬂow-performance relationship. More speciﬁcally, existing investors
in large families punish poor performance more severely than investors in small families.
Finally, we show that new money chases the top performers within their category
while old money punishes bad performers within the family. We provide evidence that
the decisions to buy or sell mutual shares are based on diﬀerent relative performance
measures. This has been largely ignored in the literature, where the buy and sell decision
has been based on the same relative performance measure.
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Figure 1: Flow-Performance Relationship
This ﬁgure shows the relationship of annualized monthly relative ﬂows and
the lagged performance during the period 2003-2008. Fund performance is
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Figure 2: Relative Inﬂows and Outﬂows and Fund Family Size
This ﬁgure shows average relative in- and out-ﬂows for diﬀerent sizes of fund
families. Fund families are sorted into four groups, families with less than or
equal to 10 funds, between 11 and 20 funds, between 21 and 30 and families
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Figure 3: Fund Family Size and the Flow-Performance Relationship
This ﬁgure shows the relationship of annualized monthly relative in-, out- and
net ﬂows and lagged performance during the period 2003-2008. Funds are
ranked into ten deciles according to their past 24-month return within the
fund’s investment objective. A large fund family is deﬁned as a fund family
with total net assets above the median.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the mutual fund data set. Panel A shows the number of
funds, number and percentage of load funds and the number of funds for each investment objective
(Germany, Europe and global). Panel B displays aggregate total net assets (TNA), in-, out- and net
ﬂows. Panel C reports the cross-sectional averages of the mutual fund data. Return is the 12-month
return as a percentage. The standard deviation is calculated using the monthly returns of the past 12
months. The expense ratio is the average expenses per year divided by the average total net assets.
The total load includes front-end and back-end loads. Age is the age since inception and size is the
total net assets under management. In addition, it gives the average number of funds per family.
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Average
Panel A: Number of Funds:
Total 233 228 239 246 247 243 239.3
Load Funds 205 202 209 214 216 208 209
Load Funds (%) 88.0 88.6 87.4 87.0 87.4 85.6 87.3
Germany 53 50 50 52 50 46 50
Europe 95 97 106 108 111 109 104
Global 85 81 83 86 86 88 85
Panel B: Aggregate Total Net Assets and Flows:
TNA (Billion EUR) 64.172 65.857 78.598 88.054 88.621 47.949 72.209
Inﬂows (%) 53.3 29.5 26.8 27.4 29.8 18.4 30.9
Outﬂows (%) 49.1 31.4 31.2 36.0 36.5 21.2 34
Net Flow (%) 4.2 -1.9 -4.3 -8.6 -6.7 -2.8 -3.4
Panel C: Fund Data
Return (%) 12.45 4.76 24.06 15.30 4.52 -37.94 3.9
Std. Deviation (%) 4.51 2.49 3.39 2.98 3.02 5.93 3.72
Expense Ratio (%) 1.42 1.39 1.42 1.35 1.37 1.40 1.39
Total Load (%) 4.04 4.09 4.08 3.87 3.98 3.94 4.00
Age (Years) 10.6 11.4 11.5 11.8 12.3 12.5 11.7
Size (Million EUR) 275.4 288.8 328.9 357.9 358.8 197.3 301.2
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